Gross worker flows over the business cycle by Krusell, Per et al.
Gross Worker Flows over the Business Cycle
Per Kruselly Toshihiko Mukoyamaz Richard Rogersonx Aysegul Sahin{
June 2015
Abstract
We build a hybrid model of the aggregate labor market that features both stan-
dard labor supply forces and frictions in order to study the cyclical properties of gross
worker ows across the three labor market states: employment, unemployment, and non-
participation. Our goal is to assess the relative importance of frictions and labor supply
in accounting for uctuations in labor market outcomes. Our parsimonious model is able
to capture the key features of the cyclical movements in gross worker ows and indicates
an important role for both frictions and labor supply.
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1 Introduction
Modern research on aggregate labor market dynamics stresses the importance of micro-
founded models of labor market ows as a way to connect micro and macro data. In this
paper we build a parsimonious model of individual labor supply in the presence of labor
market frictions and assess its ability to account for gross worker ows between employment,
unemployment and non-participation over the business cycle.
Our model represents a hybrid of the two classes of benchmark models that dominate the
literature: heterogeneous agent models following in the spirit of Lucas and Rapping (1969),
and reected in Chang and Kim (2006), and search models in the spirit of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). In the former, workers ow between employment and non-employment
and these ows represent optimal labor supply responses to changes in prices. In the latter,
workers are passive, always wanting to work but subject to frictions that sometimes prevent
them from working, thus generating ows between unemployment and employment. Reality
seems to reect elements of both benchmarks, and to the extent that participation reects
the desire to work, and unemployment reects frictions that create a wedge between desired
and actual labor supply, we think the natural starting point for assessing a hybrid model of
labor supply is to confront it with data on the gross worker ows.
Our model features households subject to idiosyncratic shocks in the presence of incom-
plete credit and insurance markets and labor market frictions. Our specication of frictions
allows for endogenous search eort while non-employed, on the job search and heterogeneity
in match quality. We also include an unemployment insurance (UI) system that reects key
features of the US system. Aggregating across heterogeneous households yields a model of
aggregate labor supply in the presence of frictions. We calibrate it so as to match steady
state levels of gross worker ows and assess the ability of specic aggregate shocks to generate
the cyclical patterns for gross worker ows that are found in the data.
We consider two types of exogenous aggregate shocks to labor market conditions: shocks
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to labor market frictions, and shocks to wages, and calibrate them to have empirically rea-
sonable magnitudes. In the context of this model we ask three main questions. First, do the
outcomes|ows and stocks|move like they move the data? Second, how important are the
shocks to the dierent components of market conditions? And third, what role does labor
supply play?
We nd that our benchmark model with shocks to frictions alone does a good job of
accounting for the key features of uctuations in gross worker ows between the three labor
market states. We argue that the simulation results reect some basic and intuitive economic
forces present in a model of labor supply in the presence of frictions. These mechanisms
actively involve the labor supply channel; even though the labor market participation rate
displays limited and only weakly procyclical movements, the gross ows in and out of not in
the labor force (N) into both employment (E) and unemployment (U) are large, volatile, and
show clear cyclical patterns. Although our benchmark model only has aggregate shocks to
frictions, the presence of on-the-job search implicitly incorporates an endogenous, procyclical
wage movement, as workers move up the job ladder more rapidly in good times. These
endogenous procyclical movements in wages give rise to important labor supply eects, so
the labor supply channel is important in allowing the model to match the behavior of gross
worker ows.
Heterogeneity is crucial to the model's ability to account for the cyclical patterns in the
gross ow data. At any point in time, most workers are quite far from the boundary of
indierence between working and not working. However, a non-negligible group of workers
is close enough to indierent that idiosyncratic or aggregate shocks can make them switch
participation status over the near term. This group turns out to be key for understanding
both gross ows and the movement of stocks over the cycle. It is thus important how our
model places restrictions on the size and composition of this group. Our calibration|the
selection of key parameters for utility, work payo, and job availability|is designed to match
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the average gross ows. The model's implications for how these ows move in response to
aggregate shocks then rely to an important extent on its implications for how the sizes of
dierent groups move over the cycle.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. One of these is the literature
on gross ows.1 Another is the literature on individual labor supply in the presence of
frictions. Ham (1982) was an early eort to rigorously study unemployment in a labor
supply setting, showing that unemployment spells could not be interpreted as optimal labor
supply responses. Consistent with his ndings, our model features both an operative labor
supply margin and unemployment, and unemployment is a departure from desired labor
supply. More recently, Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) study life cycle labor supply in
the presence of frictions. Our study is very much in the spirit of theirs, though because
our focus is on aggregate eects over the business cycle, our individuals are described in a
more stylized manner (without regard to age, etc.). Our own earlier work, e.g., Krusell et
al. (2010), is even more stylized and only looks at mechanisms in steady states, whereas the
present paper is focused entirely on aggregate uctuations.2
A third strand is a recent literature that extends general equilibrium business cycle models
of employment and unemployment to allow for a participation decision.3 The key feature
that distinguishes our paper from these is our focus on gross worker ows|these papers only
consider labor market stocks. Alternatively, our model can be viewed as adding frictions
to the labor supply model of Chang and Kim (2006), which features idiosyncratic shocks,
indivisible labor, and incomplete markets.
1This includes, for example, Abowd and Zellner (1985), Poterba and Summers (1986), Blanchard and
Diamond (1990), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Fujita and Ramey (2009), Shimer (2012), and Elsby, Hobijn,
and Sahin (2015).
2Our earlier work is signicantly less detailed: it does not have UI, costly search, nor on the job search. Our
modeling of search costs here, moreover, actually allows us to t the steady state ows signicantly better.
Finally, note that due to the nonlinearity of our model, with wealth eects, cuto decision rules, etc., it is not
sucient to make steady state comparisons as a way of understanding how cyclical movements are generated.
3These include Tripier (2004), Veracierto (2008), Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010), Gal, Smets,
and Wouters (2011), Ebell (2011), Haefke and Reiter (2011), and Shimer (2011).
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An outline of the paper follows. In the next section we document the key business cycle
facts for gross worker ows among the three labor market states for the US over the period
1978{2009. Section 3 describes our theoretical framework and describes how we calibrate it.
Section 4 examines the cyclical performance of the model. Section 5 adds wage shocks to our
benchmark model and Section 6 concludes.
2 Worker Flows Over the Business Cycle
In this section we document the business cycle facts for gross worker ows. A model that
successfully accounts for the behavior of gross worker ows will necessarily account for be-
havior of the net ows and hence the three labor market stocks|E; U , and N , though not
vice versa. It follows that matching the behavior of the three labor market stocks is a less
stringent test of a model. Because it is much simpler to describe the behavior of the stocks
and they are subject to less measurement error, we think it is useful to examine the properties
of both the stocks and the ows in the models that we consider.
To begin our analysis, Table 1 presents summary statistics from the data for the business
cycle properties for the stocks.4 We use u to denote the unemployment rate, U=(E + U),
lfpr to denote the labor force participation rate, (E + U)=(E + U +N), and Y for GDP.
Table 1
Cyclical Properties of Stocks 1978-2009
u lfpr E
std(x) :1125 :0026 :0098
corrcoef(x; Y )  :83 :36 :82
corrcoef(x; x 1) :93 :62 :91
The resulting patterns are relatively well known: employment is strongly procyclical, and
the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical. Although the labor force participation
rate is procyclical, it is not as strongly cyclical as the other two series. The unemployment
4We restrict attention to the period 1978-2009 since that is the period for which we have consistent data
on gross ows. The cyclical components in Table 1 are isolated using an HP lter.
5
rate is the most volatile of the three series, and the labor force participation rate is the least
volatile. All three series are highly autocorrelated.
We next consider the behavior of gross worker ows. We estimate these ows using
the matched Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the period 1978{2009 following an
algorithm similar to that used elsewhere.5 While some of the patterns that we highlight have
been documented in previous work (see, e.g., Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Shimer
(2012)), some details vary across studies and it is important that we have a consistent set of
statistics for the exercises we carry out later.6
An important concern when analyzing gross ows data is the possibility of classication
error. Earlier research has found these errors to be substantial, especially for transitions
between unemployment and nonparticipation.7 We implement a correction following Blan-
chard and Diamond (1990) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) to address the issue of
classication error. In particular, we adjust the gross ows data using Abowd and Zellner's
(1985) estimates of misclassication probabilities based on resolved labor force status in CPS
reinterview surveys. Table 2 shows the average values of quarterly transition rates for the
1978{2009 period with and without the Abowd-Zellner correction; in the table, fij denotes
the fraction of workers that move from state i in the previous period to state j in the current
period.8
5In particular, see Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Fujita and Ramey (2009), Shimer (2012), and Elsby,
Hobijn, and Sahin (2015).
6Dierences include the method used to identify cyclical components, the time period, as well as whether
to report statistics for ows of workers as opposed to transition rates. For example, Blanchard and Diamond
(1990) focus on the component of the time series that is accounted for by what they call \aggregate demand
shocks", whereas we focus on the cyclical component as identied using the HP lter. They consider the
time period 1968{1986, whereas we consider 1978{2009. And we characterize transition rates whereas they
characterize the level of ows. This last feature can make some properties appear dierent. For example,
whereas the transition rate from U to E (which we denote as fUE) is strongly procyclical, the fact that the
size of the unemployment pool is also countercyclical implies that the level of the U to E ow is actually
countercyclical.
7See, for example, Abowd and Zellner (1985), Poterba and Summers (1986), Chua and Fuller (1987), and
Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015).
8We do not make any correction for time aggregation when reporting statistics for the ows. Our model
will explicitly allow for some time aggregation, so the statistics in Table 2 will be the appropriate statistics for
comparing with the values generated by our model. We note, however, that with time aggregation corrections,
none of the qualitative patterns that we comment on below change. Shimer (2011) examines these ows using
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Table 2 reveals that the adjusted ows using Abowd and Zellner's estimates of misclassi-
cation probabilities are systematically below their unadjusted counterparts. Put dierently,
all three labor market states are more persistent than predicted by unadjusted ow rates.
As noted in the prior literature, ows that involve nonparticipation are aected much more
than other ows. Transition rates between employment and nonparticipation are approxi-
mately halved, while those between unemployment and nonparticipation are adjusted down
by around one third.
An alternative adjustment, suggested by Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015), involves re-
coding sequences of recorded labor market states to eliminate high-frequency reversals of
transitions between unemployment and nonparticipation. This procedure identies individ-
uals whose measured labor market state cycles back and forth between unemployment and
nonparticipation from month to month and omits such transitions (\deNUN ication"). For
example, a respondent who reported a sequence of labor market states of NUN is recoded
as being a nonparticipant NNN . Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) show that this correction
results in very similar transition rates between unemployment and nonparticipation to the
adjusted rates based on the Abowd and Zellner (1985) estimates. The average values of the
fUN and fNU transition rates with the adjusted data using deNUN ication were :146 and
:019, respectively. These values are very similar to the corresponding values in Table 2 (:137
and :021). In the remainder of our paper, we will use the average transition ow rates, as well
as labor market stocks, adjusted using the Abowd-Zellner estimates of misclassication as our
benchmark to assess the performance of our model while we will refer to both adjustments
when we evaluate cyclical performance of our model as we discuss below.
data that are corrected for time aggregation but nds the same cyclical properties as we do.
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Table 2
Gross Worker Flows 1978{2009
Unadjusted Data Abowd-Zellner Correction DeNUN ied Data
FROM TO FROM TO FROM TO
E U N E U N E U N
E :957 :015 :028 E :972 :014 :014 E :957 :015 :028
U :261 :528 :211 U :235 :628 :137 U :263 :591 :146
N :048 :027 :925 N :023 :021 :956 N :048 :019 :933
Next we turn to the cyclical behavior of the gross ows. Table 3 presents summary statis-
tics from the data for the business cycle properties for gross ows data using the unadjusted
data as well as the Abowd-Zellner adjusted and deNUN ied ows data. The series are
quarterly, produced by taking the quarterly average of monthly series, and all series are then
logged and HP ltered.
Table 3
Cyclical Properties of Gross Worker Flows
Unadjusted Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :072 :034 :074 :051 :041 :061
corrcoef(x; Y )  :68 :32 :78 :63 :60  :68
corrcoef(x; x 1) :66 :23 :82 :69 :51 :76
Abowd-Zellner Correction
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :085 :083 :085 :104 :102 :071
corrcoef(x; Y )  :62 :40 :74 :59 :52  :20
corrcoef(x; x 1) :55 :29 :74 :60 :38 :29
DeNUN ied Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :069 :036 :076 :066 :042 :063
corrcoef(x; Y )  :66 :29 :81 :55 :57  :56
corrcoef(x; x 1) :70 :22 :85 :58 :48 :57
While there is a lot of information in this table, we focus our discussion around four basic
observations. First, although the stock of non-participants does not vary that much over
the business cycle relative to the other two stocks, Table 3 shows that the ows between
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non-participation and the other states exhibit large movements at business cycle frequencies.
Specically, whereas the uctuations in the participation rate are an order of magnitude
smaller than the uctuations in the unemployment rate, the uctuations in the transition
rates into and out of non-participation are of roughly the same order of magnitude as those
in the much-studied ows between E and U . For example, looking only at the two ow rates
into employment, fUE and fNE , one would not be led to conclude that the participation rate
plays only a minor role in accounting for employment uctuations. The reason that the labor
force participation rate does not move more over the cycle is because of the osetting eect
of an increased U -to-N transition rate during good times.
Second, consistently with the earlier work of Blanchard and Diamond (1990), the U and
N states are not observationally equivalent. For example, whereas the ow rate from E into
U is strongly countercyclical, the ow rate from E into N is weakly procyclical.
Third, some of the cyclical properties revealed in Table 3 might reasonably be viewed as
counterintuitive. For example, although the participation rate increases during good times,
both of the ow rates out of participation, fEN and fUN actually increase during good times.
Fourth, the fact that the U -to-N ow rate decreases during recessions is contrary to an
apparent piece of conventional wisdom that holds that unemployed workers are more likely
to become discouraged during bad times. Note that this is not inconsistent with the fact
that the stock of discouraged workers is higher during recessions: even with a constant ow
rate between unemployment and discouragement, the fact that the stock of unemployment
is higher in recessions will also imply that the stock of discouraged workers is higher.
The cyclicality of ows are very similar for each of the two misclassication adjustments
we considered. However, applying the misclassication adjustment following the estimates
of Abowd and Zellner increases the volatility of the ow rates involving nonparticipation
considerably while the deNUN ication process does not result in a notable change for the
volatility of these ow rates. This is consistent with the type of adjustment that the two
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correction procedures involve. The Abowd-Zellner correction is a time-invariant correction
method that applies the correction probabilities to any occurrence of the state N indepen-
dently while deNUN ication applies the correction to the high frequency reversals between
N and U . When we compare models to the data, we will report comparisons with the data
adjusted using both methods to provide a better assessment of the performance of our models.
For future reference we note a related nding in the recent work by Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2015). They go one step further than we do here by looking at, among other things,
the role of \worker attachment". In particular, they nd that the composition of the unem-
ployment pool shifts towards more attached workers during recessions; this factor accounts
for around 75 percent of the decline in the U -to-N transition rate during recessions. The most
important dimension of attachment turns out to be prior employment status. This feature
will be present in the quantitative model that we study. In fact, our relatively parsimonious
model will deliver natural explanations for all of the patterns just documented.
3 Labor Supply and Gross Worker Flows
The starting point for our analysis is a model of individual labor supply in the presence of
frictions that in steady state can match the key properties of the average gross worker ows.
Once we develop this model and calibrate it so as to match the average behavior of the gross
worker ows we will subject it to shocks to study its implications for uctuations in the gross
worker ows.
Consider an individual with preferences given by:
Et
1X
t=0
t[log(ct)  et   st]
where ct  0 is consumption in period t, et 2 f0; 1g is employment status in period t, and
st 2 f0; 1g is a discrete variable that reects whether the individual engages in active job
search in period t. The parameters  > 0;  > 0 are the disutilities of work and active search
respectively and 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor. A key element of our model is that an
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individual's (net) return from work in the market is stochastic. In reality the relevant shocks
could inuence both the reward to market work and the opportunity cost of market work,
but since it is ultimately the relative value of market work that matters, we capture this
with a single shock, which we model as an idiosyncratic shock to market productivity, zt.
We assume it follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log zt+1 = z log zt + "t+1
where the innovation "t is a mean zero, normally distributed random variable with standard
deviation ".
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A salient feature of the data on gross worker ows that we presented in the previous
section is that even after cleaning the data to remove spurious ows, there remain large
movements of non-employed individuals between active and passive search. To capture this
in our model we assume that the disutility of active search, , is random. In our calibrated
model we assume that draws iid over time and distributed according to a uniform distribution
with mean  and support f   " ; ;  + "g.
The traditional literature on individual labor supply assumes that the relevant market
conditions faced by an individual are prices, most notably the wage rate (w) and the interest
rate (r). A key innovation of our labor supply model is to expand the set of market conditions
to also include four parameters|u; n; e, and |that describe labor market frictions. We
will refer to u, n and e as employment opportunity arrival rates: u is the probability that
a non-employed individual who engages in active search receives an employment opportunity;
n is the probability that a non-employed individual who does not engage in active search
receives an employment opportunity, and e is the probability that an employed individual
receives an additional employment opportunity with another employer. The subscripts u
9Because z is mean-reverting, some movements in the return to market work will be predictable whereas
some will not. A richer model would include more detail, perhaps with part of the predictable component
reecting age eects, and with multiple random components that dier in persistence. We view our approach
as a parsimonious rst step.
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and n reect the fact that active search will determine whether an individual is counted as
unemployed or not in the labor force. The parameter  is the employment separation rate
and is the probability that an individual employed in period t  1 loses his or her job at the
beginning of period t. For now we assume that market conditions are constant over time;
when we consider business cycle uctuations in a later section we will allow market conditions
to uctuate.
An employed worker's labor earnings is the product of three components: the market
wage per eciency unit of labor services (w), the idiosyncratic worker component z described
above, and a match quality component (q). Whenever an individual receives an employment
opportunity, it is accompanied by a realization of the match quality q, which is an iid draw
from a log normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation q. This value is xed
for the duration of the match and is observed at the time the employment opportunity is
received.
There is a UI program, specied so as to capture key features of the UI system in the US
while also maintaining tractability. To be eligible for UI, a worker must have previously been
employed, and experienced an employment separation shock. That is, individuals who leave
employment by choice are not eligible. In order to receive benets, we require that an eligible
individual engage in active search. Although we implicitly assume that the UI authority can
monitor search activity, we do not assume that the UI authority observes whether employment
opportunities are received or the associated match quality, so the receipt of benets imposes
no restrictions on an individual's decision to accept an employment opportunity. To capture
the fact that UI benets have nite duration while minimizing the state space, we assume
that an eligible individual loses eligibility each period with probability . We will represent a
non-employed individual's eligibility status by the indicator variable IB, with the convention
that a value of one indicates eligibility. Another feature of the UI system in the US is that
benets are related to past earnings, subject to a cap. To capture this we assume that
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an individual's UI benet is a linear function of his or her idiosyncratic shock z, up to a
maximum of b.10 Formally,
b(z) =
(
b0z if b0z  b
b otherwise.
We assume a market structure that is standard in the incomplete markets literature. The
individual cannot borrow and there are no markets for insuring idiosyncratic risk, but can
accumulate an asset, whose level we denote by a, and oers a rate of return given by r. To
capture the presence of various transfer programs that implicitly provide some insurance,
we assume that there is a proportional tax  on labor earnings and a lump sum transfer T .
Combining these features, the individual's period budget equation is given by:
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + (1  )wztqtet + (1  et)IBt st(1  )b(zt) + T
where, as above, et 2 f0; 1g is the employment indicator.
Next we describe how events unfold within a period. At the beginning of period t an
individual will observe new realizations for z; ; and IB. To detail the subsequent events
we need to distinguish individuals according to three scenarios. In the rst scenario, the
individual was not employed in the previous period and did not receive an employment
opportunity while searching. In the second scenario, the individual was not employed in the
previous period but did receive an employment opportunity and associated match quality
while searching. In the third scenario, the individual was employed in the previous period.
We begin with the individual in the rst scenario. Having received new realizations for z,
, and IB, this individual chooses whether to engage in active or passive search and makes
a consumption saving decision. Following these decisions, the outcome of search will be
realized. If the individual receives an employment opportunity (and an associated draw of
match quality) he or she will enter period t+ 1 as an individual in scenario two.
10We index benets to z rather than past earnings in order to economize on the state space while still
allowing for feedback from market opportunities to UI benets.
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Next consider an individual who enters the current period in scenario two. This indi-
vidual begins the period with an employment opportunity in hand. If the individual ac-
cepts the employment opportunity they will work this period, receive labor earnings, make
a consumption-savings decision and enter the subsequent period as an individual in scenario
3. If the individual chooses to reject the employment opportunity, they are now identical to
an individual who entered the period under scenario one, and once again makes choice about
search eort, consumption and saving.
Finally, we consider an individual who enters the period in scenario three. In the process
of transiting from the previous period to the beginning of this period we allow for two types
of developments. First, we implicitly assume that employed workers engage in passive search
and hence may receive additional employment opportunities. Second, as noted earlier, we
allow for the possibility that past employment positions are destroyed, causing the worker
to be separated. While there are various ways that one could formulate the joint outcomes,
we assume that this individual experiences one of four mutually exclusive events as follows.
With probability 1  e the individual retains their previous employment opportunity and
does not receive an additional opportunity. With probability e the individual retains their
previous opportunity but also receives an additional employment opportunity with an iid
draw from the match quality distribution. With probability u the individual is separated
from their previous employment opportunity but receives a new employment opportunity
with a new draw from the match quality distribution.11 Lastly, with probability (1 u) the
individual is separated from their previous employment position and does not simultaneously
receive a new employment opportunity.
11We interpret these individuals as the very short-term unemployed, who nd a job within the month of
separation, which is the main reason we use u for the probability of new oer. Alternatively, we could have
set this probability equal to e, on the grounds that a separating worker has the same chance of getting
an outside oer within the period as does a non-separating worker. As a practical matter this makes little
dierence, but our choice captures the possibility that a separating worker may be able to generate additional
oers through contacts. More generally we could have introduced another independent parameter to capture
this probability.
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In the event that the individual has only one employment opportunity, the situation is
identical to scenario two. In the event that the individual has two employment opportunities,
it is optimal to take the one with the higher match quality and discard the other, at which
point they are again like an individual in scenario two. Note that the combination of on-
the-job search and heterogeneous match quality implies that our model features a job ladder
in which employed individuals tend to transition to higher paying jobs over time. Finally, if
the individual is separated and has no employment opportunity, they are then identical to
an individual in scenario one.
We formulate the individual's decision problem recursively. We formulate the problem at
the point where all new shocks have been realized, so that the individual knows their current
value of z, their current value of , whether they have an employment opportunity and if so
the value of the match quality, their current UI eligibility status, and the assets brought into
the period.
An individual without an employment opportunity (i.e., what we called scenario one
above) decides both whether to engage in active or passive search and on consumption versus
saving. Let U(a; z; ; IB) and N(a; z; ; IB) denote the Bellman values for such an individual
conditional upon active search (i.e., unemployed) and passive search (i.e., out of the labor
force), respectively. An individual in this \jobless" situation will have a value denoted by
J(a; z; ; IB) that is simply the maximum of these two options:
J(a; z; ; IB) = maxfU(a; z; ; IB); N(a; z; ; IB)g
An individual with an employment opportunity (i.e., what we called scenario two above)
has an additional decision: whether to accept or reject the employment opportunity. An
individual who rejects the employment opportunity will become identical to an individual
who did not have an employment opportunity, and hence receive the value J(a; z; ; IB).
Let W (a; z; q; IB) denote the Bellman value for an individual who accepts an employment
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opportunity. An individual with an employment opportunity will choose the maximum of
these two values, which we will denote by V (a; z; q; ; IB):
V (a; z; q; ; IB) = maxfW (a; z; q; IB); J(a; z; ; IB)g:
Having developed the notation for all of these Bellman values we can now write out the
individual Bellman equations that dene these values. Working backwards from the end of
the period decisions, the Bellman equation for W is given by:
W (a; z; q; IB)
= max
c0;a00
fln c  + Ez0;q0;0 [(1     e)V (a0; z0; q; 0; 0) + efV (a0; z0;maxfq; q0g; 0; 0)
+f(1  u)J(a0; z0; 0; 1) + uV (a0; z0; q0; 0; 1)g]g
subject to
c+ a0 = (1 + r)a+ (1  )wzq + T:
The future terms on the right-hand side reect the four mutually exclusive events discussed
previously that can transpire between the end of this period and the beginning of the following
period for an individual who works today.
Next consider the Bellman equations for active and passive search. For active search we
have:
U(a; z; ; IB) = max
c0;a00
fln c +Ez0;q0;0;IB0 [uV (a0; z0; x0; 0; IB0)+(1 u)J(a0; z0; 0; IB0)]g
subject to
c+ a0 = (1 + r)a+ (1  )IBb(z) + T;
and for passive search:
N(a; z; ; IB) = max
c0;a00
fln c+ Ez0;q0;IB0 [nV (a0; z0; q0; 0; IB0) + (1  n)J(a0; z0; 0; IB
0
)]g
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subject to
c+ a0 = (1 + r)a+ T:
Our model provides a clear mapping to the data with regard to classifying a worker as
either employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. Specically, an individual who works
in period t is labeled as employed. An individual who is not employed in period t, but
engages in active search during period t is labeled as unemployed. The residual category, an
individual who is not employed in period t and does not engage in active search, is labeled
as out of the labor force.
To generate implications for aggregate gross worker ows we assume that there are a
large number of workers, each of whom is just like the individual described above, with all
of the shock realizations being iid across individuals. Given a set of market conditions (i.e.,
prices and frictions), we can then look for a stationary distribution of individuals. In this
stationary distribution there is an invariant distribution of individuals over the individual
statevariables, an invariant distribution of individuals over the three labor market states
o(employment, unemployment and out of the labor force), and an invariant distribution over
gross ows.
3.1 Calibrating the Stationary Distribution
This section describes our procedure for calibrating the parameters of our model so that the
stationary distribution with constant market conditions matches the gross worker ows in
the data. The numerical solution methods are explained in Appendix A.2.
The model has a large number of parameters that need to be assigned: preference pa-
rameters , ,  and " , idiosyncratic productivity shock parameters z and ", the variance
of the match quality shock q, frictional parameters (, u, e, and n), the tax rate  , the
transfer T , the parameters of the UI system (b, b, and ), and prices (r and w). Because
data on labor market transitions are available monthly, we set the length of a period to be
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one month.
Several parameters are set without solving the model. As is standard in the literature,
we set  to be consistent with a discount factor of :96 at an annual level, implying  =
:9947. We calibrate the shock process z to estimates of idiosyncratic wage shocks, and so
assume an AR(1) process, with  = :997 and  = :098. Aggregated to an annual level
this would correspond to persistence of :96 and a standard deviation of :206, which we take
as representative values from this literature.12 Note that the tax rate on labor income is
inconsequential, since it eectively amounts to a renormalization of the wage. We introduce
it as a way to generate the revenue for the lump-sum transfer and UI system in an internally
consistent manner. In line with various studies, we set  = :30.13 The lump sum transfer T
will be set so that the government budget balances in steady state equilibrium.
The parameters of the UI benet system are chosen as follows. First, the parameter 
is set to 1=6 so that the average duration of benets is equal to six months. We set the
cap on benets to be 46.5 percent of the average wage in our steady state equilibrium. In
our model, all exogenously separated individuals are eligible for UI, and will collect if they
are unemployed and search actively. In reality, many exogenously separated individuals may
either not be eligible or choose not to apply. To incorporate this we set our replacement rate
b so that total UI payments in steady state is in line with the data. Over the 1978{2009
period, total UI payments are .69 percent of total compensation and .85 percent of total
wages and salaries. We use a replacement rate of :23, which results in the total UI payments
of .74 percent of total earnings.
The remaining parameters are chosen so that the steady state equilibrium matches specic
12See for example, estimates in Card (1994), Floden and Linde (2001), and French (2005). Given that the
wage process consists of z and q in the model (and there is also an endogenous selection of employed workers),
the wage process does not exactly correspond to the z process. However, it turns out that the discrepancy
is small (the estimated value of the persistence parameter from the model-generated data is :984 and the
standard deviation is :109).
13Following the work of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) there are several papers which produce estimates
of the average eective tax rate on labor income across countries. Minor variations in methods across these
studies produce small dierences in the estimates, but :30 is representative of these estimates.
18
targets. Although this amounts to a large set of nonlinear equations which is solved jointly,
we think it is informative to describe the calibration as a few distinct steps.
We begin with the ve parameters , , , u, and n. We discipline the value of 
relative to the value of  based on measures of search time relative to working time. In
particular, since average time devoted to search for unemployed workers is approximately
3.5 hours per week, and average hours of work for employed individuals are approximately
40, we set  = 3:540 . Intuitively, holding all else constant, the disutility from working  will
directly aect the desire of individuals to work and hence exerts a direct inuence on the
employment rate. The gap between e and n will inuence how the non-employed are split
between active and passive search. For a given gap, the level of n will directly impact on
the ow from N to E. And the value of  will intuitively have a direct impact on the ow
from E into U . Accordingly, we set the values of , , u, and n so as to match the labor
force participation rate (:67), the unemployment rate (:065), the EU ow rate (:014) and the
NE ow rate (:023). All these values are averages from 1978 to 2009.
The two parameters e and q will directly impact the nature of job-to-job transitions in
the model. Accordingly, we set these two values so as to match a job-to-job transition rate
of 1:4% per month and an average wage gain upon experiencing a job-to-job transition of
3:3%. These targets are drawn from Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014).
The nal preference parameter to be determined is " , which governs the variation in the
disutility associated with active search. This parameter plays a very specic role in terms of
allowing our model to match the patterns in gross worker ows. As noted previously, a key
feature of the gross ow data is that even after correcting for potential spurious ows due
to misclassication, there are still large ows between U and N . Taking these ows at face
value, they suggest important temporary shocks that inuence the decisions of non-employed
individuals. We generate these ows by assuming a shock to the disutility of active search.
While this could reect real demands on an individual's time that make search more costly,
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it could also reect psychological eects associated with the job search process. We set " so
as to match this aspect of the gross ow data.
The above steps are carried out for given values of r and w. As is well known in this type
of model, the gap between r and  is an important determinant of capital accumulation.
And given a value for r the value of w will inuence the relative payments to labor and
capital. While our subsequent analysis is partial equilibrium, we impose that our steady
state values for r and w are consistent with factor prices generated from a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate production function with capital share parameter equal to :30 assuming factor
inputs are those implied by our steady state model. This procedure implies r = :0033 and
w = 2:74. The government budget balance condition then implies that T = 1:53.
Table 4 summarizes values for the other calibrated parameter values and Table 5 displays
the implications for steady state gross ows in our calibrated model, as well as the corre-
sponding average values for these ows for the US over the period 1979{2009. We report the
95% condence intervals for the ow rates in the data that were calculated using bootstrap-
ping on the microdata. Further details regarding data sources and the construction of labor
market ows are provided in Appendix A.1.
Table 4
Calibration
Parameter Values
 z "    u n  e q "
:9947 :997 :098 1=6 :425 :037 :275 :204 :0178 :054 :036 :026
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Table 5
Gross Worker Flows in the Data and the Model
Abowd-Zellner Adjusted Data Model
FROM TO FROM TO
E U N E U N
E :972 :014 :014 E :973 :014 :013
95% CI (:970; :973) (:013; :015) (:013; :016)
U :235 :628 :137 U :215 :663 :122
95% CI (:218; :254) (:607; :649) (:120; :154)
N :023 :021 :956 N :023 :017 :959
95% CI (:020; :025) (:018; :023) (:954; :960)
While the nonlinear nature of the model prevents a perfect match to the gross ow data
given the number of free parameters and the additional moments being matched, Table 5
indicates that the model does a very good job of matching the gross ows found in the
data. Almost all ow rates lie within the 95% condence interval for the ow rates. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the rst structural model to present such a close t to these
data. Previous work has not been able to provide such a close match to the ows between
unemployment and nonparticipation, and since ows must sum to one, these earlier studies
have necessarily missed on the other ows as well.
4 Fluctuations in Gross Worker Flows
Our main goal is to examine the extent to which our labor supply model of gross worker ows
can match the properties of uctuations in Tables 1 and 2 when subjected to empirically
reasonable shocks to market conditions. Our initial exercise will assume that the only source
of shocks is to frictions, i.e., we will assume that the two prices|w and r|remain constant.
This exercise is of particular interest, since many researchers, e.g., Hall (2005), have argued
that a model in which wages are perfectly rigid oers a good account of labor demand
movements in the sense that it accounts for cyclical movements in the job nding rate in
a model with a xed labor force. In this section we will take as given the uctuations in
frictions found in the data and ask whether such a model also provides a good account of
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labor market ows in a model that explicitly allows for an endogenous participation margin.
4.1 Modeling Shocks to Market Conditions
There are a few dierent ways that we could proceed. One strategy would be to estimate
the model using some type of simulated moments estimator on time series data. We instead
adopt a much simpler and, we think, more transparent approach that oers some important
insights into the role that dierent driving forces play in shaping the cyclical properties of
gross worker ows. Specically, given that our focus is on business cycle uctuations and
that a key feature of business cycles is comovement among series, we eectively focus on
perfectly correlated movements in market conditions that reect business cycle movements.
We then ask whether such movements can account for business cycle uctuations in gross
worker ows if the relative variances of the movements in each variable are set to empirically
reasonable values. Intuitively, we want to consider shocks to labor demand that manifest
themselves in uctuations in prices and frictions.
The simplest implementation of this method would posit a latent aggregate state s that
follows a Markov process, with prices and frictions all being functions of this latent aggregate
state s.14 As is common in the business cycle literature with heterogeneous agents, we assume
that the shocks to market conditions follow a two state Markov process. We will refer to one
state as the \good" state (denoted by a superscript G) and the other state as the \bad" state
(denoted with a superscript B). The good state will have a high value for the employment
arrival rates u, e and n, and a low value for the employment separation rate . We
denote the two possible realizations for the market conditions shock as (Gu ; 
G
n ; 
G
e ; 
G) and
(Bu ; 
B
n ; 
B
e ; 
B). We parameterize these shocks as Gu = 

u+"
, Bu = 

u ", G =  ",
and B =  + ", where u and  are the values for the model calibrated to match
average transition rates. We assume that movements in e and n are such as to maintain
14More generally, one might consider a specication in which the innovations are perfectly correlated but
in which the individual components display dierent degrees of persistence.
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constant ratios relative to u. We assume that the transition matrix for the Markov process
is symmetric, with diagonal element denoted by .
In our model, both the level and uctuations in fUE closely mimic the level and uctu-
ations in u. For this reason we choose the value of "
 so that the uctuations in fUE in
the simulated model match the standard deviation of the uctuations in fUE found in US
data. This leads to " = :0632. Given values for the i's, which inuences the impact of
time aggregation on measured fEU , the level and uctuations in fEU closely follow the level
and uctuations in , so we choose " = :0025 so as to match the uctuations in fEU . We
match the volatility values based on the Abowd-Zellner correction procedure. The value of
 is set to :983.
4.2 Cyclical Properties of Stocks
We begin with the less stringent test in which we assess the ability of the model to match the
cyclical movements in the three labor market stock variables|employment, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the participation rate. Table 6 shows the results for the benchmark model and
the data. To compute correlations with output in our partial equilibrium model we generate
a series for output by taking our model generated series for capital and eciency units of
labor and using them as inputs into a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share
parameter of :30.
Table 6
Behavior of Stocks in the Data and the Model
Data Model
u lfpr E u lfpr E
std(x) :1125 :0026 :0098 :118 :0020 :0089
corrcoef(x; Y )  :83 :36 :82  :99 :15 :99
corrcoef(x; x 1) :93 :62 :91 :88 :66 :89
Table 6 reveals that our model of labor supply with shocks to frictions as the sole driving
force does a very good job of accounting for the behavior of the three labor market stocks,
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not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. The key result here is that the behavior of
the participation rate in the model closely matches its behavior in the data. In a two-
state model with an exogenously xed participation rate, shocks to job-nding and job-
loss rates that match the movements in the data will necessarily provide a close match to
observed movements in E and U precisely because movements in participation are modest in
comparison to movements in employment. The key issue then is whether our model featuring
an endogenous participation margin will generate empirically reasonable movements in the
participation rate. Table 6 shows that our model is able to account for roughly 80 percent
of movements in the participation rate, as well as the modest procyclical nature of these
uctuations.
It is important to emphasize that it is not clear a priori that this model would match
even the qualitative features of participation rate uctuations. The reason for this is that
there are several competing forces. In a much simpler model, Krusell et al. (2010) show that
holding all else constant, decreases in job-nding rates and increases in job-separation rates
lead to less time spent in employment, thereby lowering income. This decrease in income
leads to a negative wealth eect on labor supply, as individuals seek to increase time spent
working in order to compensate for the loss in income. Individuals who desire to work more
will be more likely to engage in active search when not employed, and will be less likely to
leave a job when employed. These responses tend to generate a countercyclical participation
rate.
But another force works in the opposing direction. In this model, participation for a
non-employed worker represents an investment decision, in that a worker needs to pay the
up-front cost associated with active search in order to generate a potential ow of income
associated with successful job search. In good times there are three factors tending to increase
the return on this investment. First, the probability of a successful search is greater. Second,
the fact that separation rates are lower implies that a job match will last longer. Third,
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because arrival rates of outside opportunities for employed workers are higher, the prospects
for wage increases via job-to-job transitions are greater. These three factors make it more
likely that the individual will engage in active search in good times, leading one to expect
procyclical participation.
There are also eects that interact with the presence of UI benets. In bad times there
is an increase in separations, and these workers are all assumed to be eligible for UI. But
collecting UI requires active search. Benets may induce some individuals to search actively
who otherwise would not. On the other hand, lower arrival rates of jobs in bad times can
increase the probability that benets expire for an individual, which may lead to fewer
individuals receiving benets.
Despite the opposing forces at play, Table 6 shows that our model not only matches the
key qualitative properties found in the data, but also does a good job quantitatively. While
the model does somewhat underpredict the size of uctuations in the participation rate, a
point we shall return to later, we view the results in Table 6 as a signicant success for the
model.
4.3 Cyclical Properties of Gross Flows
We next consider the more stringent test of whether the model is able to account for the key
patterns in the gross ows that underlie these patterns for the stocks. Table 7 displays the
key business cycle facts about the gross ows in the data and in the model. While we targeted
the volatility of fEU and fUE using the Abowd-Zellner adjusted data, we also include the
data based on the alternative adjustment.
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Table 7
Gross Worker Flows in the Data and the Model
A. Abowd-Zellner Adjusted Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :085 :083 :085 :104 :102 :071
corrcoef(x; Y )  :62 :40 :74 :59 :52  :20
corrcoef(x; x 1) :55 :29 :74 :60 :38 :29
B. DeNUN ied Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :069 :036 :076 :066 :042 :063
corrcoef(x; Y )  :66 :29 :81 :55 :57  :56
corrcoef(x; x 1) :70 :22 :85 :58 :48 :57
C. Model
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :085 :069 :085 :036 :047 :060
corr(x; Y )  :79 :08 :69 :91 :52  :97
corr(x; x 1) :77 :13 :71 :67 :67 :90
The model is able to account for the key cyclical patterns: it captures the counter-
cyclicality of unemployment inows (E-to-U and N -to-U ow rates), the procyclicality of
unemployment outows (UE and UN ow rates) and the procyclicality of ows between
E and N . Although the model is very successful in replicating the cyclicality of the ows,
there are some discrepancies between the data and the model in terms of the magnitudes
of uctuations for some of the ows. However, it is important to note that the alternative
method for correcting for classication error (what we refer to as \deNUN ication") implied
levels of volatility that are much more in line with those predicted by our model. In view
of this we feel that the discrepancies in volatility levels in Table 7 should not be viewed as
particularly problematic. In what follows we focus on the describing the economics behind
the cyclicality patterns.
Some of these cyclical patterns in the gross ows are quite intuitive and so do not merit
much discussion. For example, the procyclical ow rate from U to E is mechanically driven
by the procyclical shocks to u, and the countercyclical ow from E to U is mechanically
driven by the countercyclical pattern in the shocks to . However, as noted earlier, we
believe that two of the patterns that the model is able to replicate are at least somewhat
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counterintuitive. Specically, during good times the ows from E to N and U to N are both
higher, despite the fact that the stock of workers in N is countercyclical. In what follows we
describe the economics behind these patterns.
In thinking about the response of ows to a change in market conditions it is useful to
distinguish two broad types of eects. At any point in time, individuals are distributed across
the space of individual state variables. For a given set of market conditions, decision rules
partition this space into the three labor market states E, U , and N and gross ows result
from individuals crossing the boundaries between these regions. Hence a key determinant
of these ows will be the mass of individuals who are near the boundary. When market
conditions change, the boundaries of these regions change, and some individuals will change
states even conditional on not experiencing any change in their individual state variables.
Note, however, that these are essentially one time changes in ows, in the sense that once
the boundaries have adjusted and individuals are reclassied, going forward in time the ows
will again be dictated by the mass of individuals crossing xed boundaries. While both one-
time and persistent eects will shape the resulting correlation patterns, in the presence of
persistent shocks to market conditions the correlations will intuitively be dominated by the
persistent responses, which reect movements of individuals across boundaries, rather than
the movements in the boundaries themselves.
We start with the ow from U to N . To understand this change it is essential to consider
the changing composition of the unemployed. In particular, the key dynamic is that the
composition of this group shifts toward individuals who are less attached to work (i.e., close
to the boundary of indierence between U and N), thereby increasing the the fraction of
unemployed individuals who cross the boundary into nonparticipation.15 To see why, note
that in good times unemployed workers exit to employment more quickly, so the pool of
15In fact, for a given distribution of workers in the unemployment pool the immediate impact of a decrease
in frictions is to expand the participation region (i.e., shrink the region of state space that maps into N)
and decrease the fraction who cross from U into N . But the resulting dynamic eects associated with lower
frictions changes the composition of the unemployment pool and increases the U to N ow.
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unemployed individuals is relatively more composed of individuals who have just entered
unemployment. Since employed workers are less likely to enter unemployment in good times
(recall that the job separation probability decreases in good times), new entrants to unem-
ployment are dominated by individuals that transition from N to U . But these individuals
are more likely to be close to the boundary, making them more susceptible to a transition
that puts them back in the N state. This model feature is consistent with Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2015), who show that the composition of the unemployed pool shifts towards more
\attached" workers during recessions, where the most important dimension of attachment is
prior employment status. They show that this mechanism accounts for around 75 percent of
the decline in the UN ow rate during recessions.
Next we consider the ow from E to N . In the model this ow is very weakly procyclical.
Note also that similar to the data, this ow exhibits very little serial correlation. These two
properties stem from the fact that the persistent response in the EN ow turns out to be very
close to zero, so that the statistics for this ow are dominated by the immediate one-time
changes in ows that are associated with the change in boundaries dened by the decision
rules.16 To understand these eects it is important to note that there is an option value
associated with staying employed. In particular, an employed individual understands that
after a quit and hence a transition to N , it will be costly to return to E in the future (due to
search costs and/or the time it takes to receive an employment opportunity). It follows that
an employed individual needs to consider this option value when deciding whether to remain
employed. As is standard in such a setting, an individual will remain employed even when
it is \statically" suboptimal, on account of the option value of staying employed. When an
aggregate shock decreases the level of frictions, the implicit costs of nding employment go
down, and the option value diminishes. This results in a one time ow from E into N .
16The small persistent eect in turn reects the combined eect of several small eects, including compo-
sitional eects and changes in wealth.
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Lastly we consider the NU and NE ows. In the model the former ow is countercyclical
and the latter is procyclical, as in the data. To see why the model delivers this pattern, note
that the primary source of ows from N into U or E is those individuals who are close to the
boundary but on the N side. A small shock to individual state variables could push such an
individual across the boundary and into the U or E regions. For an individual to ow into
U , the individual must not receive an acceptable employment opportunity in the meantime,
since this will take them from N into E instead. But during good times the increase in job
opportunity arrival rates implies that marginal N workers are more likely to receive oers
that take them into E, thus decreasing the ow of these workers into U .
The above analysis assumed that there were aggregate shocks to both the job nding
rates and to the job loss rates. It is also of some interest to assess the relative importance
of these two types of shocks. To evaluate this we use the identical parameterization of the
model but then simulate the model with the business cycle shock to the job-loss rate shut
down. In the interest of space we do not present the detailed results, but instead oer a
brief summary. For the behavior of the three labor market stocks the main nding is that
this specication reduces the volatility of both the unemployment and employment rates by
about one third relative to the benchmark, with a much smaller decrease (roughly 10%) in
the volatility of the participation rate.
The behavior of the gross ows are relatively unaected with two exceptions. The rst
is the volatility of fEU . Not surprisingly, with shocks to  shut down the volatility of fEU
is reduced dramatically. However, the time aggregation implicit in our model specication
does lead to countercyclical movements in fEU even in the absence of shocks to , though
this eect accounts for only about 20 percent of the movement in fEU . The other notable
dierence is that the volatility of fUN is reduced in half relative to the benchmark model.
This is consistent with the explanations that we have articulated above. Specically, we
argued that the procyclical movement in fUN resulted from a composition bias, due to the
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fact that in good times the unemployment pool was increasingly composed of individuals
who entered U from N . But the decrease in the job-separation rate during good times was
one of the factors that inuenced the size of this composition eect, since in good times it
served to reduce the number of individuals in U who entered from E. It follows that shocks
to the job loss rate are important in shaping the observed behavior of ows between U and
N .
4.4 Summary
The above discussion has focused on describing the intuition for the qualitative patterns
found in Table 7. We conclude that the economics implicit in the model that is responsible
for these patterns is quite straightforward, and for this reason we think the results are a
robust feature of our relatively parsimonious labor supply model of worker ows. Of course,
the extent to which the model can reproduce the quantitative features of uctuations in gross
ows depends not only on the qualitative patterns but also the quantitative magnitudes of
the various eects. It is reasonable to think that a key factor for the quantitative results is the
mass of individuals that are near the participation boundary. In this regard, the discipline
in our quantitative work derives from the fact that our steady state model is consistent with
the average level of gross ows.
5 Wage Shocks
The preceding analysis indicates that shocks to labor market frictions alone in our model of
labor supply give rise to economic mechanisms that qualitatively and quantitatively capture
many of the salient patterns in the movements of gross worker ows over the business cycle.
Nonetheless, since the model was only able to generate about 80 percent of the uctuations in
the participation rate, in this section we examine the eects of adding an additional shock to
market conditions, namely a shock to the wage rate per eciency unit of labor. Intuitively,
standard intertemporal labor supply responses suggest that procyclical wages will lead to a
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procyclical response in the desire to work, suggesting a procyclical response in participation
in our model, a response that will primarily occur through the impact on the indierence
boundaries of workers. In this section we examine these responses quantitatively.
As a rst step it is relevant to consider movements in real wages in the data and in our
benchmark model. As is well known, many measurement issues come into play when measur-
ing the cyclicality of average real wages in the data. There are two commonly used measures
of wages in macro studies. The rst measure is the average hourly earnings of production
and nonsupervisory employees in the private sector and is based on the establishment survey.
The second measure is real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector, based on
the productivity and costs releases.17 We calculate the volatility of wages for the 1978{2009
period using each of these two measures. When we use the rst measure we deate the
average hourly earnings using both the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deator,
which also matters. We nd that the standard deviation of average hourly wages is .0083
when deated with the CPI and .0049 when deated with the GDP deator. When we use
the real compensation measure, the two analogous gures are .0111 and .0102. However, a
key issue for our purposes is the extent to which these movements in real wages are correlated
with the cycle. In fact, these wage movements display very little correlation with GDP when
one compares the cyclical components from an HP lter: for the four dierent real wage
series noted above, the correlations with GDP range from  :089 to  :005. If we regress the
cyclical component of real wages on GDP and several lags, the standard deviation of the
predicted part of the real wage series is .003. We will use this as our benchmark target in
the experiment that follows.
We previously noted that the presence of a job ladder in our model combined with pro-
cyclical job-nding rates implicitly leads to procyclical average wages even if the wage per
eciency unit is constant over time. In our benchmark specication in the previous section
17For example, Gertler and Trigari (2009) use the rst measure while Gal (2011) use the second one. Gal
(2011) shows that these two measures have dierent implications for wage ination.
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the standard deviation of the of the average wage is roughly .002, and has a correlation of
.52 with output. Roughly half of this procyclicality of the wage is due to the procyclicality
of average match quality, with the other half due to the fact that fewer high productivity
workers lose their jobs during good times. Even with a very conservative interpretation of
the data on average wage movements over the business cycle, this suggests that there is scope
for additional movements in wages. In what follows we will consider wage shocks that are
0:5% higher in the good state and 0:5% lower in the bad state. In the results reported below,
the standard deviation of the average wage increases by roughly 50 percent, to .0029, with
a correlation of .75 with GDP. Interestingly, because the procyclical movement in the wage
per eciency unit will induce additional individuals to participate, we nd that the average
value of z turns from mildly procyclical to mildly countercyclical.18
The model remains exactly as before and the calibration of the steady state is identical.
The only change is that when we consider business cycles we assume that the wage per
eciency unit of labor moves together with the labor market frictions, and so takes on two
values: wG and wB. Given a level of uctuations in wages, we calibrate the shocks to market
frictions exactly as before.
5.1 Results
We begin by looking at how adding wage shocks in addition to friction shocks aects the
behavior of the three stocks. Results are reported in Table 8.
Table 8
Behavior of Stocks With Friction and Wage Shocks
Data Model
u lfpr E u lfpr E
std(x) :1125 :0026 :0098 :119 :0022 :0102
corrcoef(x; Y )  :83 :36 :82  :99 :70 :98
corrcoef(x; x 1) :93 :62 :91 :88 :84 :89
18A more complete set of results for the behavior of the various components of wages is available in the
Appendix.
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As expected, adding wage shocks increases the uctuations in participation and also serves
to make them more procyclical. This table shows that with modest wage shocks added the
model now accounts for roughly 90 percent of the movements in the participation rate, and
provides almost a perfect match to the volatility of employment. Whereas the model without
wage shocks generated a correlation between participation and output that was marginally
too low, this specication errs on the other side. These results suggest a modest role for wage
movements. Table 9 shows how these wage shocks aect the properties of the gross ows.
The basic patterns are essentially unaected by the addition of wage shocks, so we do not
spend any additional time on them.
Table 9
Gross Worker Flows in the Data and the Model
A. Abowd-Zellner Adjusted Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :085 :083 :085 :104 :102 :071
corrcoef(x; Y )  :62 :40 :74 :59 :52  :20
corrcoef(x; x 1) :55 :29 :74 :60 :38 :29
B. DeNUN ied Data
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :069 :036 :076 :066 :042 :063
corrcoef(x; Y )  :66 :29 :81 :55 :57  :56
corrcoef(x; x 1) :70 :22 :85 :58 :48 :57
C. Model
fEU fEN fUE fUN fNE fNU
std(x) :085 :050 :085 :034 :049 :063
corr(x; Y )  :85 :16 :75 :89 :55  :98
corr(x; x 1) :77 :12 :71 :62 :64 :91
While the above results might suggest that cyclical wage movements and their associated
labor supply responses play a modest role, this conclusion is somewhat premature. The
reason for this is that as noted above, our model with on-the-job search and shocks to
frictions implicitly contains an element of procyclical wage movements. Moreover, this eect
is quantitatively important. Although we do not report the details here, when we considered
a similar model that did not allow for on the job search, calibrated in the same fashion, we
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found that friction shocks alone generated less than half of the uctuations in the participation
rate. In this sense we think that our model suggests an important role for wage eects on
participation. We conclude that labor supply responses associated with procyclical wage
movements are an important element in accounting for cyclical movements in participation.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model of individual labor supply in the presence of frictions and used
it to simulate the eects of aggregate shocks to prices and frictions on the labor market
outcomes for of a large set of households. Our key ndings are (i) that a model calibrated
to match steady state ows does well in accounting for the cyclical movements of the ows;
(ii) uctuations in job nding and job loss rates alone do a good job of matching the data,
though this performance involves induced procyclical wage movements through the eects of
frictions wage ladder climbing; and (iii) the labor supply channel is important, despite the
relatively modest, though procyclical, uctuations in the labor force participation rate. It
is interesting to note, in particular, that as a corollary our model with worker heterogeneity
can match the uctuations in the participation rate with a rather standard formulation of
household preferences, something which has proved challenging with other setups.
Our model oers a rich yet parsimonious description of individual labor supply in a setting
with heterogeneity, search frictions and an empirically reasonable market structure. It is the
rst paper to consider the eects of aggregate shocks on individual labor market transitions in
this setting. However, it is also simplistic in some dimensions relevant for the microeconomic
data. One of these dimensions regards our model of the household as an innitely-lived
unit. Clearly, an extension that distinguishes dierent members of the households would be
relevant, as would an age dimension, along the lines of Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010).
We do believe that our framework is a very useful starting point for extensions in various
directions. It can also be used to understand how policy inuences labor supply responses,
34
For example, we could use our model to understand how changes in features of the UI system
would inuence the labor supply side of the labor market. As one exercise, we have abolished
the UI system in our benchmark model and asked how this aects labor supply responses.
Interestingly, it leads to greater volatility in both the unemployment and employment rates,
as well as in the labor force participation rate.
Related, we also believe that it is useful for assessing a variety of further issues, such as
the heterogeneous eects of business cycles on various subgroups of the population. While
we have focused on aggregate shocks to frictions and the return to market activity, we can
also study other aggregate shocks, including various candidates for demand shocks.
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Appendix
A.1 Data
The Current Population Survey (CPS) reports the labor market status of the respondents
each month that allows the BLS to compute important labor market statistics like the unem-
ployment rate. In particular, in any given month a civilian can be in one of three labor force
states: employed (E), unemployed (U), and not in the labor force (N). The BLS denitions
for the three labor market states are as follows:
 An individual is counted as employed if he or she did any work at all for pay or prot
during the survey month. This includes part-time or temporary work as well as full-time
year-round employment.
 An individual is considered unemployed if he or she does not have a job, has actively
looked for employment in the past 4 weeks and is currently available to work.
 An individual is classied as not in the labor force if he or she is included in the labor
force population universe (older than 16 years old, non-military, noninstitutionalized)
but are neither employed nor unemployed.
Households are interviewed for four consecutive months, rotate out for eight months and
then rotate in for another four months. The panel feature of the CPS makes it possible to
calculate transitions by individual workers between these three labor market states. However,
not all the respondents stay in the sample for consecutive months; the rotating feature of the
panel implies that only 75 percent are reinterviewed according to the CPS sampling design.
Moreover, many other respondents cannot be found in the consecutive month due to various
reasons and are reported as missing. The failure to match individuals in consecutive months
is known as margin error and it causes biased estimates of the ow rates as discussed by
Abowd and Zellner (1985), Fujita and Ramey (2009), and Poterba and Summers (1986). The
simplest correction for margin error is to simply drop the missing observations and reweight
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the transitions that are measured, a procedure that is known as the missing-at-random
(MAR) method. However, this procedure could lead to biases if missing observations are not
missing at random. To deal with this problem, Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and
Summers (1986) proposed alternative corrections for margin error which use information on
labor market stocks. Their correction reweights the unadjusted ows in order to minimizes
the distance between the reported labor market stocks and the stocks that are imputed
from the labor market transitions. We follow the algorithm proposed by Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2015), which is similar in spirit to Poterba and Summers' method, but diers in
implementation. We use the basic monthly CPS les from January 1976 to December 2009.
All transition probabilities are calculated for the population older than 16 years old and are
seasonally adjusted. In addition, we correct for classication error using the estimates of
Abowd and Zellner (1985)which use the reinterview surveys to purge the gross ows data
from classication error. For a detailed discussion of this procedure see Elsby, Hobijn, and
Sahin (2015).
We also compute 95% condence intervals for various statistics we report related to gross
ows data using bootstrapping. We begin by sampling with replacement 5000 times from
each month of the longitudinally-linked Current Population Survey (CPS) data (each drawn
sample has the same number of observations as the original data), from January 1978 to
December 2009. For each of the 5000 sample data series, we calculate raw ow rates using the
labor status variable and CPS nal weights. We then apply the Abowd and Zellner (1985) and
margin adjustment corrections to each sample data series. Finally, we seasonally adjust the
time series of ow rates for each of the 5000 sample series (any month for which a longitudinal
link cannot be made for any observations are linearly interpolated). By computing the
statistics using each of the 5000 series, we are able to construct a distribution of values for
standard deviations, correlations, and autocorrelations. We then report bootstrapped means
and condence intervals.
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A.2 Computation
As is described in Section 3.1, the calibration of some parameters of the steady-state
model involves building a simple general equilibrium model in the background. In particular,
we calculate the steady-state values of w, r, and T as the outcome of the general equilibrium
described below. In addition, b is a function of the average wage of the economy, and thus it
is also a xed-point object.
The general equilibrium structure is very simple. The economy is populated by continuum
of (population one) workers whose decision problem is described in the main text. On the rm
side, there is a representative rm who operates competitively19 with production function
Yt = K

t L
1 
t ;
where  is set at .3. Kt =
R
aitdi is aggregate input of capital services (which is the sum
of the workers' assets) and Lt =
R
eitzitqitdi is aggregate input of labor services (which is
the sum of the employed workers' eciency unit of labor). Output Yt can be used either
for consumption and investment, and capital depreciates at the rate  = :0067. From the
assumption of the competitive factor market, wt and rt+ are set at the level of the marginal
products of eciency unit of labor and capital stock.
The government balances budget every period, that is, it sets the lump-sum transfer Tt
by
Tt =
Z
wteitzitqitdi;
where  = :30 as we specied in the main text.
One can dene a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium of this economy in a standard man-
ner, that is, (i) workers optimize given the prices, (ii) the representative rm optimizes, (iii)
the markets clear, and (iv) the government budget clears.
The computation steps of the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is as follows.
19One can think of a \island" structure as in Krusell et al. (2011) in order to maintain consistency between
the labor market frictions and the competitive behavior by rms and workers.
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1. Guess the steady-state level of K=L (which determines w and r), T , and the average
wage.
2. Perform the optimization of the workers.
3. Compute the invariant distribution of the workers over the individual state variables.
4. Compute K=L, T , and the average wage that are implied by the invariant distribution,
and compare with the earlier guess. If they do not coincide, revise the guess and repeat
from Step 2 until convergence.
For the worker optimization (Step 2), we set 48 uneven grids (more grids closer to zero)
over individual capital stock (from a = 0 to a = 1440), 20 grids on z, and 7 grids on q. Both
stochastic processes of z and q are discretized using Tauchen's (1986) method (the ranges of
the grids are set at two unconditional standard deviations). We have converted the annual
AR(1) process into monthly AR(1) process using the formula analogous to the ones in Chang
and Kim's (2006) Appendix A.2. In optimization, we have allowed for choosing o-grid values
of at+1 by linearly interpolating the value functions across the grids.
For the computation of the invariant distribution, we represent the distribution of workers
in terms of the \density" (i.e. how many people are at each state) over the state variables
(a; z) in addition to the employment status and UI eligibility. For employed workers, q is an
additional state variable. We iterate the density using the decision rules that were derived in
Step 2 and the Markov transition matrices for stochastic processes until it converges to an
invariant density. In the a direction, we have used a ner set of grids (1000 grids) instead of
the original 48 grids in calculating the density. (The decision rules are linearly interpolated.)
In the economy with shocks, we take the values of r, T , and b as constant. Given the
shocks on 0s, , and w, we can calculate the outcomes in the main texts in the following
two steps.
1. Perform the optimization of the workers.
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2. Simulate the aggregate behavior using the decision rules from the optimization and the
stochastic processes.
The optimization procedure is similar to the steady-state case. Simulation starts from
the invariant distribution derived in the steady-state model. We simulate the economy for
5000 periods and discard the initial 1000 periods in calculating the statistics.
A.3 Some properties of the model steady state
In this Section, we examine the microeconomic properties of the benchmark model (with-
out aggregate shocks) and compare them to the stylized facts found in microeconomic studies.
First, studies such as Rendon (2006) show that in general employed workers accumulate
asset and nonemployed workers deaccumulate asset. We can see that this is consistent with
the saving behavior of the model agent.
Figure 1: Decision rules for next period asset (net increase), for a given asset level
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Figure 1 draws the decision rules (in terms of net increase in asset) for each employment
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(and UI eligibility) status. These decision rules are evaluated at the average values of z
and q for each status (the value of  is set at the median value of the distribution). As we
can see, employed workers accumulate asset unless a is very large and nonemployed workers
deaccumulate asset.
Second, some studies, such as Stancanelli (1999), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), Algan
et al. (2002), and Lise (2013) document how asset levels are associated with the change in
employment status. In general, it is found that increasing one's asset level decreases the
probability of moving from nonemployment to employment (making the reservation wage
higher) and increases the probability of moving from employment to nonemployment.
In our model, this can be seen from the decision rules for searching when nonemployed and
quitting when employed. In as space of idiosyncratic productivity z and wealth a, Figure
2 shows the threshold level of idiosyncratic productivity of searching for UI eligible and
ineligible workers. (They search above the threshold.) Nonemployed workers start searching
for a job if their productivity is above a certain threshold. This productivity threshold can
also be interpreted as a proxy of the reservation wage. As the gure shows, the wage required
to engage in costly search is higher for wealthier individuals for both eligible and ineligible
workers, consistently with the stylized facts.
Here, UI eligible workers start searching at lower levels of productivity. This is because
we assume that they can receive UI benets only when they engage in search. In other
words, here UI acts to subsidize their job search. This nding turns out to be consistent with
the ndings of Mukoyama, Patterson, and Sahin (2014) who nd that UI eligible workers
search more even controlling for observable characteristics of workers. It also accords with
the ndings of Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) who nd that workers who were employed
a year ago are less likely to stop searching and leave the labor force. Recall that to be UI
eligible workers need to have been employed recently. In this regard, Lentz and Tranaes
(2005) nd, using Danish data, that search intensity exhibits positive duration dependence
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over the unemployment spell, which suggests that wealth has a negative eect on job search
as suggested by our model.
As for the threshold to quit working, we plot the threshold productivity for employed
workers with dierent levels of wealth (for a given value of q). (They quit below the thresh-
old.) As the Figure shows, wealth increases the threshold productivity that the worker
continues to work. Workers who have high match quality continue to work even when their
idiosyncratic productivity is low.
Next we describe the properties of the wealth distribution of the benchmark model. Table
A3.1 summarizes the wealth level at each quintile, normalizing the 60% level to 1.
Table A3.1
Wealth level at each quintile (compared to 60%)
20 40 80 90 95 99
Data :004 :33 2:51 4:59 9:56 42:12
Model :003 :17 4:06 7:33 9:99 13:15
The data gures are taken from Daz-Gimenez et al. (2011, Table 1). The diculty of
this type of model in matching the very top of the wealth distribution is well-documented.
Except for the very top, however, the model does a decent job in generating a large amount of
wealth heterogeneity that is in line with the data. The properties of the wealth distribution
of this type of model has been studied extensively in the literature. See, for example, Krusell
and Smith (1998), Casta~neda et al. (2003), and Lise (2013).
Table A3.2
Average wealth levels
Total E U N
26:9 31:3 26:1 18:7
All numbers are normalized to the (pre-tax) average earnings of employed workers. Fi-
nally, we present the average productivity (only the z part) of each employment category.
Table A3.3
Average productivity z
Total E U N
1:90 2:67 2:09 0:42
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Figure 2: Upper panel: the threshold level of idiosyncratic productivity of searching for UI
eligible and noneligible workers; lower panel: the threshold level of idiosyncratic productivity
of quitting into nonemployment for UI eligible and noneligible workers|benchmark model.
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A.4 Additional model properties: wages
There are three components of individual wages: aggregate component wt, individual
productivity zt, and match quality qt. As the composition of employed workers change over
the business cycle, the average values of zt and qt move cyclically.
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Table A4.1
Behavior of average wages: benchmark model
avg(wzq) w avg(z) avg(q)
std(x) :0018 :0000 :0020 :0008
corrcoef(x; Y ) :52 NA :25 :67
Table A4.1 summarizes the behavior of average wages. (As in the main text, all variables
are aggregated to quarterly, logged, and HP-ltered with the parameter value of 1600.) The
wage per eciency unit of labor, w, is acyclical by assumption. However, the average wage
per employed worker, avg(wzq), is procyclical. Both average values of z and q are procyclical
and thus contribute to the procyclicality of average wages.
Table A4.2
Behavior of average wages: Section 5
avg(wzq) w avg(z) avg(q)
std(x) :0029 :0025 :0016 :0008
corrcoef(x; Y ) :75 :92  :28 :60
Table A4.2 summarizes the behavior of the model with wage shocks. With this specica-
tion, avg(z) is now countercyclical. Both w and avg(q) contributes to the procyclicality of
the average wage per employed worker.
A.5 Model comparison with Great Recession data
In this Section, we look at a specic episode of the Great Recession in light of our model.
Labor force participation rate declined signicantly during the Great Recession. A substantial
part of this phenomenon is related to demographic trends, in particular the aging of the U.S.
labor force. The Figure below shows the labor force participation rate starting from 1996,
the year that the share of prime-age workers peaked in the labor force. After 1996, the U.S.
population gradually started to age. A simple way to isolate the eect of aging is to compute
age-adjusted labor force participation rate. First let us dene the labor force participation
rate as the weighed average of labor force participation rates of dierent age groups i where
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sit is the population share of age group i at time t:
lfprt =
X
i
sit  lfprit:
Then let us set the population shares to their values in 1996 and dene the age-adjusted
labor force participation rate as
lfprct =
X
i
si;1996  lfprit:
We choose 1996 as our base year since 1996 was the year that the share of prime-age popu-
lation peaked and the share of individuals older than 55 started to increase. Figure 3 shows
that as the baby boom generation moved from their prime ages (the age category with the
highest participation rates) into the older ages, the labor force participation rate has declined;
xing the population shares at their 1996 levels explains more than 60 percent of the decline
in the labor force participation rate which took place starting in 2008.
Figure 3: Actual and age-adjusted labor force participation rates.
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Since demographic change is beyond the scope of our paper, we now provide a comparison
of the model's prediction for a sample recession with the demographically adjusted labor
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force participation rate in the Great Recession period. In the upper panel of Figure 4, we
normalize the actual and age-adjusted labor force participation rates to their 2007 levels
and plot the change in the 12-month centered average of these rates, along with the change
in the unemployment rate for the 2007{2011 period. We also plot a sample recession from
the simulations of our model in the lower panel of Figure 4. As the model shows, there
is an initial pick-up in participation which reverses rapidly. This is similar to the Great
recession where the participation rate did not start to decline until after the second half of
the recession. In the rest of the sample, the unemployment rate increase is accompanied by
declining participation, quite in line with how it behaved during the Great Recession. Thus,
we think that our model is a promising starting point for thinking about this particular
episode and we plan to pursue this issue more in future work.
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Figure 4: Upper panel: change in actual and age-adjusted labor force participation rates
and the unemployment rates relative to 2007. Lower panel: labor force participation and
unemployment rates in the model simulation|benchmark model.
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